The error of his perceptions, in such a case, is only deteclcd by comparing them with the perceptions of other people; and it is evident that he lias just the same reason to impute error to them, as they can have individually for imputing il to him. The majority, indeed, necessarily carries the point as lo all practical consequences; but is there any absurdity in alleging lhat we have no internal, infallible, and necessary assurance of that in w hich the internal conviction of an individual must be supported, and may be overruled by the testimony of his fellowcreatures?Dr. Reid has himself admitted, that ” we might probably have been so made, as to have all the perceptions and sensations which we now have, without any impressionon our bodily organs at all.” It is surely altogether as reasonable lo say that we might have had all Ihoseperceptions, without the aid or intervention ofanv material existence at all. Those perceptions might still have been accompanied wilh a belief, too, thai would not have been less universal or irresistible for being utterly without a foundation in reality. In short, our perceptions can never afford any complete or irrefragable proof of the real existence of external things; because it is easy lo conceive that we might have such perceptions without them. We do not know, therefore, with certainly, that our perceptions are ever produced by external objects ; and in the cases lo which we have just alluded, we find perception and ils concomitant belief, where we do know with certainty that il is not produced by any external existence.It has been said, however, that we have the same evidence for the existence of the material world as for that of our own thoughts or conceptions ; as we have no reason for believing in the latter, but lhat we cannot help it; which is equally true of Ihe former. Now, this appears to us to be very inaccurately argued. Whatever we doubt, and whatever we prove, we must plainly begin with consciousness : that alone is certainall the rest is inference. Does Dr. Reid mean to assert, that our perception of external objects is not a necessary preliminary lo any proof of their reality, or that our belief in their reality is not founded upon our consciousness of perceiving them? Our perceptions, then, and not llie existence of Iheir objects, is what we cannot help believing ; and il would be nearly as reasonable to say lhat we must take all our dreams for realities.